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Abstract—Siemens produce a range of industrial human
machine interface (HMI) screens which allow operators to both
view information about and control physical processes. For
scenarios where an operator cannot physically access the screen,
Siemens provide the SM@rtServer features on HMIs, which
when activated provides remote access either through their own
Sm@rtClient application, or through third party VNC client
software.
Through analysing this server, we discovered a lack of
protection against brute-force password attacks on basic devices.
On advanced devices which include a brute-force protection
mechanism, we discovered an attacker strategy that is able
to evade the mechanism allowing for unlimited password
guess attempts with minimal effect on the guess rate. This
vulnerability has been assigned two CVEs - CVE-2020-15786
and CVE-2020-157867.
In this report, we provide an overview of this vulnerability,
discuss the impact of a successful exploitation and propose
mitigations to provide protection against this vulnerability.
This report accompanies a demo presented at CPSIoTSec
2020 [2].
I. INTRODUCTION
Industrial control systems (ICS) are the systems respon-
sible for the control and operation of both critical national
infrastructure (CNI), including oil and gas, water treatment
and power generation, as well as manufacturing processes.
Industrial control systems are made up of many speciality
devices, including programmable logic controllers (PLCs),
remote telemetry units (RTUs) and human-machine interfaces
(HMIs), with major manufacturers including Siemens, Allen
Bradley, Honeywell, Schneider Electric and General Electric.
These systems are often referred to as Operational Technology
(OT). In ICS, safety is the number one concern, with devices
designed to operate reliably for many years. The security
of such devices was largely physical - they were designed
to sit without an internet connection behind locked doors.
In modern times, however, this is not the case with devices
regularly being connected to the internet. Incidents such as
the Stuxnet and Triton malware, which specifically target
industrial systems, and legislation such as the European
Network and Information Systems (NIS) directive have put
the cyber security of industrial systems very much in the
focus. As part of this, there are an increasing number of
vulnerabilities being discovered, and eventually patched, in
industrial devices.
Human machine interfaces (HMIs) primarily refer to a
physical device which is designed to be installed in physical
proximity to a physical process. HMI screens are programmed
to both provide a display of information relating to the
physical process below, as well as allow operators to provide
inputs to the control system to control and manage physical
processes. These screens can vary from a few inches in size up
to “full size” monitors, with modern devices usually featuring
a touchscreen, and in some cases a set of physical inputs
including buttons and dials. Most ICS manufacturers produce
some range of HMI screens, including Siemens who produce
a wide range of these devices, two of which can be seen in
Figure 1.
Some HMIs support remote access, which allows operators
in a central location to access screens that human operators
are unable to access. This provides obvious benefits, allowing
engineers to correct issues remotely as well as monitor and
control processes. Device manufacturers provide their own
methods for this remote access. Communication is usually
achieved over network connections, with most modern devices
featuring an ethernet port and/or wireless connectivity. In the
case of Siemens, the primary method is through the use of the
VNC-based Sm@rtServer system available on most of their
HMI range, which provides access through a Sm@rtClient
application (available for PC, Android and iOS), as well as
through third party VNC clients.
We discovered a vulnerability in Siemens HMI prod-
ucts that allows an attacker to be able to brute force the
Sm@rtServer password. On basic devices, we find that there is
no protection against brute forcing the Sm@rtServer, allowing
for the use of existing online password cracking tools. We
discover that on higher end devices, the Sm@rtServer employs
a form of brute-force prevention, which we were able to evade
allowing for slightly slower, but still overall successful, brute
force attempts. Successfully guessing this password could in
some cases grant an attacker full control over the HMI screen,
and therefore control over the underlying process, causing a
potentially dangerous, life threatening situation.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: In
section II we provide an overview of the Siemens HMI
range and Sm@rtServer service. In Section III we provide
an overview of the vulnerability and how it was discovered,
and discuss the potential impact of successful exploitation
in Section IV. Finally, we propose some mitigations in
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(a) A Siemens KTP700 Basic HMI panel (mounted onto box), controlling a
virtual process
(b) A Siemens Mobile Panel 277 IWLAN V2, mounted on cabinet
Fig. 1: Two Siemens HMI devices
Section V.
A. Responsible Disclosure
The discussed vulnerabilities were reported to Siemens
on the 13th of February 2020. Siemens have accepted
the vulnerabilities and have assigned two CVEs to this
vulnerability:
• CVE-2020-15786 for the brute forcing of passwords.
• CVE-2020-15787 for the issues of password truncation
when using a VNC client.
The vulnerability is addressed in Siemens Security Advisory
(SSA) 524525 [8]. Whilst they are preparing updates to
counter the problem, the suggested countermeasure is to
apply “Defence-in-Depth” [5].
II. BACKGROUND
A. Siemens HMI Range
The Siemens HMI range is currently split into two main
branches: the “Basic” range and the “Advanced” range.
The Basic range are simple panels, which feature a
touchscreen and buttons, available in 4, 7, 9 and 12-inch
models, with the KTP product name. A KTP700 7-inch
display is visible in Figure 1a. Basic panels feature a custom
Linux-based operating system.
The Advanced range includes the comfort panel range,
which are available in sizes from 7 to 22 inches, both in
touchscreen and non-touchscreen variants. These devices
utilise Windows CE as the base operating system.
The advanced range also includes mobile panels. Part of
this range are similar to the basic range, but rather than
requiring mounting are self-contained, wired units that can
be moved around. Also available are a series of wireless
panels which use WiFi connections to communicate with
other devices, such as the Mobile Panel 277 IWLAN, as seen
in Figure 1b. These wireless devices also use Windows CE
as the base operating system.
All of the mentioned devices utilise a network connection
to communicate with other devices, including PLCs. The
Siemens PROFINET protocol is used over ethernet or wireless
for this purpose. The network connection is also used for
configuring and programming the devices using the Siemens
TIA portal software.
1) Past vulnerabilities: There have been a number of
vulnerabilities that have been found in Siemens HMI products,
and we will discuss a small number of recent vulnerabilities
here. For example, CVE-2020-7592 describes unencrypted
communication between HMI screens and the configuration
software, which could allow an attacker with network access
to potentially capture sensitive information. CVE-2019-10926
is a vulnerability affecting many PROFINET devices, where
a large number of specially-crafted UDP packets can trigger
a denial-of-service condition. Finally, CVE-2019-6577 is one
of many vulnerabilities affecting the web server included on
some HMI devices, in this case a cross-site scripting attack
is possible if an attacker is able to modify particular parts of
the device configuration via SNMP.
B. Siemens Sm@rtServer and Sm@rtClient
The Siemens Sm@rtServer is primarily marketed as a
solution for the remote servicing of plants, in particular
for handling problems that cannot be solved by staff on
site [6]. Primarily, the Sm@rtServer application provides
remote access to an HMI panel, allowing a remote operator
full control over an HMI, allowing them to both read the
state of processes and issue commands to the system.
The primary way to access the Sm@rtServer is through
the Sm@rtClient application, available for Windows, Android
and iOS. An example of a connection to a KTP700 basic
panel can be seen in Figure 2a, and a TP1500 Comfort panel
in Figure 3a. The Sm@rtClient software allows interaction
both with the screen, and a mapping of the physical inputs
(such as buttons and dials) that feature on many HMIs. The
Sm@rtServer also supports connections by third party VNC
clients.
Through examining the communication between the
Sm@rtClient software and Sm@rtServer, we identify that
TightVNC is used as the underlying VNC protocol, utilising
the “Tight” security type1. For third party VNC clients, stan-
dard VNC authentication is used, limiting password lengths
to 8 character. When using the Sm@rtClient, an alternate
authentication scheme is used which permits passwords
greater than 8 characters, which we believe is custom to
Siemens. When examining the traffic, Tight authentication
capabilities of “SICRSCHANNEL” and “SICRSCHANLPW”
are offered, the second of which is selected by Sm@rtClient,
and both of which are rejected by other VNC clients. We
were unable to find any other references to this through web
searches, which leads us to believe this is a Siemens defined
authentication capability that permits longer passwords.
Whilst the Sm@rtServer is installed by default on all tested
HMIs, it requires a licence to operate fully. The server can,
however, run without a license with full functionality, but
a dialog appears frequently on the screen advising that the
running server is unlicensed.
We have observed two versions of the Sm@rtServer system
on different HMIs. A basic, and more vulnerable, version
is available on the KTP range of basic panels, with fewer
options that can be configured. On higher end panels with a
Windows CE underlying OS, such as the Comfort and Mobile
range, a more advanced version of the Sm@rtServer is used
with further configuration options.
By default, traffic from the Sm@rtClient app to the
Sm@rtServer is unencrypted, though encryption is available
on the full version (though this requires activation). Connec-
tions from third party VNC clients are always unencrypted
(except for password transmission). Whilst we do not explore
this issue in this paper, unencrypted VNC communication
could potentially leak highly sensitive information about the
industrial process.
C. Setup and configuration
The Sm@rtServer is activated on HMI screens through the
Siemens TIA portal software. However, this only activates
the functionality on the device. Configuring, including setting
an access password, and starting the server is done within
the settings screens of the device itself. Figure 2a shows an
example of this configuration screen on the Basic range of
HMIs, and Figure 2b shows the main configuration screen
for the advanced ranges of HMIs including the Comfort and
Wireless ranges.
Once the server is activated, the primary task is to set
a password. This has to be done on the screen itself. On
both versions of the Sm@rtServer, two passwords can be
set. By default, the second is set to allow read-only access
to the screen, though this option can be selected for either
password. Due to the limitation of many VNC clients, if a
password longer than eight characters is entered, a warning,
as seen in Figure 2c, is displayed. This advises that the
password will not work with legacy or third party clients,
which is true. The user can however ignore this warning and
1https://vncdotool.readthedocs.io/en/0.8.0/
rfbproto.html#tight-security-type
set a longer password, which will limit them to only use
the official Sm@rtClient client software. This message may
encourage users to select passwords that are 8 characters
or shorter to allow for future access via third party VNC
clients. There is no form of strength meter or policy on the
quality of the set password, which may lead users to enter
a less secure password as has been demonstrated in user
studies [9]. Further, producing warning when setting a longer
password for those who not require VNC access and can
benefit from the enhanced security of a longer password is
counter-productive.
There is also concern of the security of passwords that are
entered on the devices directly. Often, the HMI touchscreens
are far less precise than most modern touchscreens, such as
those found on smartphones and tablets, and typing on them
required use of a clunky on screen keyboard. As the password
is set on the HMI directly, this may lead the operator to set
a less secure password. In a study by Melicher et. al [3],
they find that creating passwords on mobile devices such as
phones and tablets is more frustrating and time consuming
for users, and users set less secure passwords with fewer
capital letters and grouped special characters. This confirms
similar results from past studies [10].
III. VULNERABILITY
The vulnerability takes advantage of the Sm@rtServers
support of the VNC protocol, allowing it to be used with
most VNC clients. By allowing users to connect using VNC
clients, there is an opportunity for an attacker to brute force
the password using off-the-shelf tools for basic panels, and
through scripting for advanced panels, such as the Comfort
range.
Through breaking the password, the attacker can gain
control of the HMI screen. Whilst they have full control
of the screen itself over a VNC connection, a connection
over VNC does not allow the attacker to control the physical
inputs (such as buttons and dials) that feature on many HMIs.
If the attacker wishes to do this, they would need to use the
official Sm@rtClient application with the stolen password,
which is able to map these inputs. This application is free
to download from the Siemens website and so this is not a
barrier for an attacker.
A. Preconditions
In order to exploit the vulnerability, an attacker would need
network access to the device. This could either be through
access to an OT network through compromise, or through
devices being connected directly to the internet. A simple
search on Shodan for devices with port 102 open (the port
used by the Siemens S7 protocol used by devices) reveals a
large number of Siemens devices publicly accessible2.
The Sm@rtServer feature, whilst available on all devices,
is not activated by default. This means that only devices for
which the service has been activated, and configured, are
vulnerable to the attack.
2https://www.shodan.io/search?query=port\%3A102
(a) Basic Sm@rtServer configuration (b) Advanced Sm@rtServer configuration (c) Advanced Sm@rtServer password length warning
Fig. 2: Sm@rtServer configuration
Device Firmware Version
KTP700 Basic 15.01.00.00 24.01
TP1500 Comfort Panel V2 V15.01.00.00 26.01
MobilePanel 277 IWLAN V2 12.0.0.0
TABLE I: Tested devices and firmware versions
The impact of the attack can vary depending on how the
HMI screens have been designed by the operator. We discuss
the impact of the attack more in Section IV.
B. Basic panels
For basic panels, there is no form of restriction on login
attempts when connecting over VNC. This means that we can
use any standard tool capable of cracking VNC passwords,
such as Hydra 3.
When using Hydra, the attacker simply needs to specify
the VNC protocol, state that no username is required and
provide a password list. Hydra recommends that for VNC
brute forcing, no more than 4 threads are used to prevent
overloading the server.
Hydra will not open a connection to the HMI once a correct
password is found, and will only print to the screen. The
attacker can configure Hydra to stop guessing after the first
successful password is found, or to keep guessing. As we
discuss in section III-D, this is worth doing as there may be
multiple passwords that are valid.
C. Advanced panels
On the Comfort and Mobile Wireless HMIs, there is some
level of protection against brute forcing of the password. If an
attacker simply tries and guesses passwords using the same
technique as the basic panel, the connection is refused after 5
incorrect guesses have been made. This refused connection is
different to the normal authentication error when attempting
with an incorrect password.
We first attempted to evade this limitation through slowing
down the guess rate. However, we found that even with a very
slow guess rate of 1 every 10 seconds, the 5 guess limitation
still applies. We then attempted to make 5 guesses at full
speed, then waiting for increasing time periods before making
further guesses, which still provided a negative result.
3https://github.com/vanhauser-thc/thc-hydra
The next step was to change IP addresses after 5 guesses,
which has the effect of a “new” device making guesses. We
did this by simply changing the IP of the attacker machine
manually after every 5 guesses by switching network profiles
within the Kali VM (we used a slow guess rate of 1 per second
to be able to achieve this switch). After the 5 guesses with
the first IP, we switched to the second and were successfully
able to make a further 5 guesses before being locked out for
the second IP.
This made it clear that the protection mechanism works on
an IP basis, meaning that, as long as the IP changes, one can
make further guesses. Our first assumption was that the device
maintains a single register which will store a single IP and its
failed guess count, meaning that one can switch between 2
IP addresses every 5 guesses and make an unlimited number
of guesses.
We first tested this theory with 2 IP addresses, making 5
guesses at a rate of 1 per second before switching between
them. We found that on returning to the first IP, the device
rejected the connection. We then gradually increased the delay
per guess to see if there is a time factor involved, and at
1 guess per every 4 seconds, we were able to continuously
make guesses without a rejected connection. This implies
that there is a 20 second lockout period.
We again tested with a single IP with a 20 second
sleep period after 5 guesses, which still resulted in rejected
connections. We eventually concluded that in order to make
continuous attempts, the attacker needs to switch IP addresses
every 5 guesses and not return to an IP address within 20
seconds. Therefore, if the attacker can increase the pool of IP
addresses they can use, they can increase the rate of guesses.
We produced a bash script for automating this process,
which modified the host IP address automatically. We tested
with up to 8 IP addresses, and achieved a rate of 1 guess
every 0.5 seconds. If the attacker is able to use the full 254
IPs available in a single subnet, they would be able to make
approximately 3800 guesses per minute.
1) Limitations: Obviously, changing the IP address can
have an effect on the host machine. If the “attacker” machine
was a compromised host within the network, then changing
the IP could cause services already running on that machine
Number of IP ad-
dresses
Time per guess (sec-
onds)
Guesses per
minute
2 4 15
4 1 60
8 0.5 120
256 0.015625 3840
TABLE II: Guess rate by number of IPs
to fail, alerting administrators. Similarly, increasing the count
of IPs makes the attack more noticeable, especially at high
guess rates. For an attacker who wishes to remain covert, the
best approach would be to use 2 IP addresses at the slowest
guess rate possible. The brute force will take a long time but
will result in minimal additional packets on the network.
An attacker who has control of multiple machines could
also split the load across these machines rather than modify
the IP address of a single machine, which would prevent the
issue of damaging existing services. A botnet could provide
an easy method of achieving a large pool of machines.
D. Limitations of VNC passwords
In most versions of VNC, passwords are limited to 8
characters. In some cases, this results in passwords longer
than 8 characters being truncated by VNC clients. As an
example, if a Sm@rtServer password longer than 8 characters
is set, most third party VNC clients will fail to authenticate.
When setting a longer password, the HMI displays a warning
to the user (such as in Figure 2c).
One effect of this is that, when brute forcing passwords
using a word list and a VNC-based client, an attacker can
find “successful” passwords that are longer than 8 characters,
as long as an 8 character password has been set. For example,
if the password is set to “password”, then guesses such
as “password1” or “password!” are marked as successful,
and will allow authentication through VNC clients. This can
potentially make brute-force attempts easier. As an example,
the wordlist that we used for testing featured “password!”
and “password123” above “password” on the list, and so we
would get a successful password that will allow access earlier
than we otherwise would.
IV. IMPACT
The primary impact of this vulnerability is that if an attacker
gains control of the HMI screen, they can potentially control
the underlying physical process. This is entirely dependent on
the design of the HMI screens programmed by the operator.
In some cases this screen can provide full control over the
process, in others it will only display information about
the running process. Similarly, the Sm@rtServer can be
configured to provide read only access to the device. Even
in the scenario where an attacker cannot control the process
directly, they can gain valuable information about the process
that can assist in carrying out further attacks against the
associated devices [1], [4].
It is worth noting that Siemens, in their “Security Guide-
lines for SIMATIC HMI Operator Panels” document [7],
suggest limiting direct control of physical processes to remote
users. This does however require further programming effort
on behalf of the operator.
If the programmed HMI screen features an exit button (as
is the default on screen templates), which is not protected by
a local account on the device (distinct from the Sm@rtServer
authentication), the attacker can exit to the configuration
screens for the device itself. This can have three affects. First,
this would allow an attacker to change the configuration of a
device, for example, changing the assigned IP address. On
Windows CE based devices this includes access to the control
panel, as seen in Figure 3b.
Secondly, further applications are available on the Windows
based devices. These can include Internet Explorer, Word and
Excel Viewer, and a command prompt access, which could
all be used to perform covert attacks against other devices
from a trusted device, avoiding firewalls.
Finally, as the attacker can gain access to the Sm@rtServer
configuration screen, they can modify any settings relating to
the screen. This can include changing the configured password.
The most notable effect, however, is that they can configure
the Sm@rtServer to disable the physical touchscreen whilst
a remote connection is active. This setting can be seen in
Figure 2b. This would mean that an attacker would have full
control over the screen, whilst a local operator would not be
able to take back control until the attacker has closed the
connection.
V. SOLUTIONS
We will now propose mitigations for the immediate
protections for devices, as well as longer term solutions.
Note that this is in additional to the recommendation from
Siemens in their security advisory relating to this vulnerability
to apply “Defence-in-Depth” [5].
A. Mitigation
The primary mitigation to prevent this attack is to disable
the Sm@rtServer feature if possible until a software update
has been released. However if the Sm@rtServer is required
to maintain plant operation, there are other measures than can
be taken to provide short-term mitigation against the attack:
• Limit client use to the Sm@rtClient application only,
which allows for password lengths greater than 8
characters, and ensure standard good password practice
is maintained when choosing the required password. If
VNC access is required, then ensure a strong 8 character
password is chosen to make brute-forcing as difficult as
possible.
• Ensure that no two HMIs share the same password.
• Ensure that the Sm@rtServer is configured to allow
read-only access if control input is not required.
• Configure firewall rules to only allow specific client IP
addresses to access target devices over VNC connections.
• Configure intrusion detection systems to look for large
volumes of failed VNC connection requests to single
HMIs.
• Configure screens to prevent users from exiting to the
system configuration screens.
(a) TP1500 Home Screen (b) TP1500 Control Panel
Fig. 3: TP1500 Comfort home screen and control panel
• Configure on-screen confirmation for remote connections
(for scenarios where operators are present on site and
remote access is for remote support only) [7].
• Configure a different password to prevent access to the
settings menus without further authentication [7].
B. Solutions
For a longer term solution, the device needs to reliably
be able to temporarily limit password guessing attempts, but
not block the client IP for long periods as this could prevent
genuine access to the device. Through our interaction with
Siemens whilst disclosing this vulnerability, they are intending
to patch this aspect of the vulnerability.
The system should prevent users, who are accessing over
a remote connection, from being able to select the options
to lock the screen whilst a remote user is connected, as this
would prevent the attacker from locking the screen to local
operators.
The long term solution would be to migrate away from
the VNC protocol for remote access to allow other methods
of connection, or if VNC protocol access is maintained, a
move to a more effective authentication and authorisation
mechanism that does not rely on passwords and only permits
authorised clients access.
Authentication and authorisation is a widely-studied field,
with an increasing number of alternative to password-based au-
thentication methods. Many of these could be applicable to OT
environments and devices and provide stronger authentication
for what is often safety critical pieces of equipment. This will
not be a straightforward process, however, due to the safety
and real-time operation requirements of industrial devices,
and usability issues with touchscreens or basic physical
keyboards.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have described a vulnerability that we have
discovered in Siemens HMI products. The vulnerability allows
an attacker to brute force the password of the Sm@rtServer
remote access solution due to insufficient protections against
such brute-force mechanisms. Successful exploitation of this
vulnerability potentially grants an attacker great control over
the underlying physical process, allowing an attacker to cause
large amounts of damage to physical property, loss of critical
services such as power generation or water treatment, or in
extreme cases physical harm to humans.
We also propose mitigations and push for stronger authen-
tication of HMI panels, and other ICS devices. It is time that
OT security in general draws upon the authentication and
authorisation advances made in other domains, though we
accept that there are safety and real-time considerations for
OT devices which makes direct application of such techniques
not a straight forward process.
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